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Abstract. A knowledge argument is offered that presents unique difficulties for 
Christians who wish to assert that God is essentially omniscient. The difficulties 
arise from the doctrine of the incarnation. Assuming that God the Son did 
not necessarily have to become incarnate, then God cannot necessarily have 
knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind. If this is right, then God’s 
epistemic powers are not fixed across possible worlds and God is not essentially 
omniscient. Some options for Christian theists are discussed, including rejecting 
traditional theism in favour of some version of pantheism or panentheism.
INTroDuCTIoN
In this paper I  offer a  knowledge argument that presents unique 
difficulties for Christians who wish to assert that God is essentially 
omniscient. Specifically, I  will argue that, if we assume that God the 
Son did not necessarily have to take on a  human nature and become 
incarnate, God cannot necessarily have knowledge de se of the content 
of a  non-divine mind. If this is right, then some of God’s epistemic 
powers – in this case, the power to have knowledge de se of the contents 
of a human mind – are not possessed essentially and divine omniscience 
is not omniscience simpliciter.
Toward the end of this paper I will consider a few options Christians 
may have in light of the problem raised for traditional Christian theism 
from orthodox Christology. my guess is that none of these options will 
be very appealing to orthodox Christian theists.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss an unsuccessful knowledge 
argument against omniGod theism (the metaphysics of theism on which 
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God is understood as essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-
benevolent). Next, distinguishing what is known from how it is known 
and focusing on Christian theism, I offer a new knowledge argument. 
I  then address some objections. Finally, I  discuss some options for 
Christian theists in the face of the problem raised in this paper.
I. GrIm’S KNoWleDGe ArGumeNT AND NAGASAWA’S rePlY
Patrick Grim has argued against generic traditional theism1 from 
knowledge de se.2 Grim argues that no one else, including God, can 
have knowledge de se of another person. ergo, divine omniscience is 
not omniscience simpliciter. If divine omniscience is not omniscience 
simpliciter, then, assuming that omniscience is an essential attribute of 
God’s, God does not exist (see Nagasawa 2008: 17-18).
Yujin Nagasawa argues that Grim’s argument is not sound.3 Nagasawa’s 
strategy in response to Grim’s argument is to first restate statements 
about divine omniscience in terms of divine epistemic powers. epistemic 
powers qua powers are subsumed by omnipotence. on the most widely 
accepted view of divine omnipotence, God’s failing to be able to do what it 
is necessarily impossible to do does not undermine divine omnipotence. 
because God is not another person (e.g., me or you), God cannot know 
what that person knows in having knowledge de se. If God could know, 
then God would be that person. Since God is distinct from that person, it 
is necessarily impossible for God to have the epistemic power necessary 
to have such knowledge. So Grim is requiring that God be able to do 
what it is necessarily impossible to do. This does not undermine God’s 
omnipotence, including God’s epistemic powers. So Grim’s argument 
fails (Nagasawa 2008: 21-25).4 Given the assumptions expressed by both 
Grim and Nagasawa about the nature and object of knowing in having 
knowledge de se, Nagasawa’s reply to Grim is a success.5
1 by ‘theism’, Grim clearly means to refer to omniGod theism in his work.
2 Grim’s arguments appear in Grim (1983), (1985), and (2000).
3 An earlier version of his argument against Grim’s argument is in Nagasawa (2003).
4 Nagasawa considers five objections to his argument that I will not list here. Successful 
or not, his replies display an impressive concern for rigour that is characteristic of all 
Nagasawa’s arguments in his book.
5 In chapter three of his book, Nagasawa considers arguments from concept posses-
sion based on concept empiricism against traditional theism. Such arguments go from 
the inability of God to experience states such as fear to the claim that God cannot have 
the concept of fear.
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II. DIFFICulTIeS PoSeD bY THe INCArNATIoN 
AND KNoWleDGe DE SE
In this section I  offer an argument against divine omniscience from 
knowledge de se that does not share the liabilities of Grim’s argument 
that make it susceptible to Nagasawa’s critique. my argument focuses 
on difficulties that result from orthodox Christology. I will argue that 
given certain assumptions about the doctrine of the incarnation, God as 
understood by traditional Christianity cannot be omniscient simpliciter. 
Non-Christian theism and variants of Christian theism that do not 
endorse the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation will not be susceptible 
to this argument, nor will those that allow for God to relate to the 
universe differently from how God does on traditional Christian theism. 
Hence, most Christian pantheists and panentheists who wish to accept 
some variant of the traditional doctrine of the incarnation will be able 
to avoid the problem I  present. (And in the last section of this paper 
I briefly discuss how and why at least some possible variants of pantheism 
and panentheism would be able to avoid the problem generated by the 
argument presented here.)
2.1. Knowledge de se
Suppose we distinguish between how a person believes a proposition from 
what a person believes (Perry 1994: 182-83). What Ichiro believes when 
he believes that he is making a mess is the same thing maria believes when 
she believes of Ichiro that he is making a mess. only how they believe 
what is believed differs from Ichiro to maria. That is, Ichiro and maria 
may both believe the same thing, but in different ways. If we assume this 
distinction is a  correct one to make, then, turning to God and Ichiro, 
the object of God’s knowledge can be the same as the object of Ichiro’s 
knowledge when he believes ‘I  made a  mess’. The intentional object of 
both God’s belief and Ichiro’s belief is the same. but while God can know 
what Ichiro knows when Ichiro knows he made a mess, God knows it in 
a different way. Furthermore, assuming that God and Ichiro are different 
persons and neither one is a proper part of the other, there are ways in 
which God cannot know what they both know. How God knows that 
Ichiro made a mess is restricted by God’s being distinct from Ichiro.
The following two assumptions are worth making clear before 
proceeding further. First, I  am assuming that John Perry (1994) is 
correct that the object of knowledge in cases of knowledge de se 
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includes a  sentence. So knowledge de se is a  species of knowledge de 
dicto. Second, I am assuming that the object of knowledge in cases of 
knowledge de se is a singular sentence. more specifically, I assume that 
the object of knowledge can be understood as a russellian proposition, 
where a russellian proposition is not a  sui generis Platonic entity that 
is somehow more than what is represented in a  representation token 
such as a  sentence. rather, a  russell proposition ‘contains the entities 
indicated by words’ (russell 1903: 47). So a  proposition on this view 
is a  state of affairs that has as its constituents some object or objects 
and relations and/or properties. The proposition expressed by ‘my car 
is blue’ is a state of affairs involving my car and its being blue, and the 
proposition expressed by ‘Andrei is married to lara’ is a state of affairs 
involving Andrei and lara standing in the symmetrical relationship of 
being married to one another. I  assume that a  sentence is false when 
what it represents is not made true by anything in the world, and it is true 
when what it represents is made true by something in the world. both 
assumptions are consistent with Perry’s views. And they deliver the result 
that we can distinguish between what is known and how it is known.6
The foregoing distinction between what is known and ways of 
knowing can be further illuminated by the following example. Suppose 
that you do not speak German. You have a German friend who does not 
speak english. You both know the same thing, viz., the state of affairs 
represented by ‘Snow is white’ and ‘Schnee ist weiß’. but the way that you 
and your friend know the same thing is different. The way you know the 
proposition in question is through the english sentence above. She knows 
it via a German sentence. If you were both bilingual, speaking German 
and english, you would both know it in two different ways. Suppose we 
add further that you have never actually seen snow. You have seen photos 
of snow and you have been told that snow is white. Your friend first came 
to know the colour of snow by direct acquaintance with snow. Thus, how 
you know what you know is different in yet another way.
2.2. The incarnation and knowledge de se
Traditional Christianity asserts that Jesus of Nazareth is one person with 
two natures. According to the formula of Chalcedon, Jesus is a person 
6 Nagasawa (2008) mentions strategies in the debates over knowledge arguments 
that invoke russellian propositions briefly in a  footnote. but since Grim does not 
express a commitment to such entities, Nagasawa does not consider such strategies (see 
Nagasawa 2008: 18, note 7).
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who is fully God the Son and fully human.7 And God the Son freely 
took on a human nature in becoming incarnate. The incarnation was not 
metaphysically or logically necessary according to Christian orthodoxy.
If the two minds account of the incarnation, most recently and 
thoroughly articulated and defended by Thomas V. morris (1986) and 
richard Swinburne (1994), is correct, then Jesus Christ has two minds, 
a divine mind and a human mind. on this view, the human consciousness 
of Christ is contained in his divine consciousness. Timothy bayne (2001) 
has referred to this understanding of the incarnation as ‘inclusionism’.8 
I will follow bayne in employing this locution in what follows.
on inclusionism, there is an asymmetrical relationship between 
the divine and human consciousness such that Jesus qua God the Son 
has unrestricted first-personal epistemic access to the consciousness of 
Jesus qua human, but not vice versa. more importantly, as just noted, the 
divine consciousness contains the human consciousness within it, but 
not vice versa. Such a relationship allows God to have knowledge de se of 
what is experienced by Jesus qua human.
As noted above, Christian theism does not assume that God the Son 
is necessarily incarnate. It was possible for God not to become incarnate. 
So, to employ the language of possible worlds, there are possible worlds in 
which God the Son can have knowledge de se of a human consciousness 
and worlds where God cannot have such knowledge. And whether or not 
God can have such knowledge depends upon God’s relationship to the 
world – specifically, it depends upon whether God the Son is incarnate 
in that world.
Consider the following. Suppose that at world w1 Jesus is God the Son 
incarnate. Jesus is in the wilderness, fasting for forty days. Jesus knows 
that he is hungry. Suppose that the belief component of Jesus’s knowing 
takes as its intentional object the proposition expressed by ‘I am hungry 
right now’.9 In w1, when God is aware of Jesus’s hunger, God’s knowledge 
7 I write in the present tense because traditional Christians take this to be true of Jesus 
of Nazareth even now (since they believe that he literally ascended to heaven after being 
resurrected from the dead).
8 bayne critiques standard inclusionism and offers a  restricted inclusionism as an 
alternative. I will not worry about his critique of inclusionism here or the details of restricted 
inclusionism. For a reply to bayne, see Sturch (2003). bayne responds in bayne (2003).
9 I  here assume that knowledge is justified true belief that is reliably produced by 
some belief-producing mechanism. However, some epistemologists, e.g., Timothy 
Williamson (2002), argue that knowing is a mental state. Whether knowing is a mental 
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of Jesus’s hunger can also be expressed as knowledge de se. This is the 
case because God the Son, qua incarnate divine mind, has the same sort 
of access relationship to the body of Jesus that the human mind of Jesus 
bears to the relevant human organism that is in need of food. God the 
Son knows from the inside that Jesus is hungry. And the way God the 
Son knows it can be expressed in the same way it is expressed in the 
human mind of Jesus of Nazareth. both the divine mind and human 
mind of Jesus have knowledge de se of the hunger of Jesus. So in w1 God 
has the epistemic power requisite to have knowledge de se of the content 
of a human mind.
While in w1 Jesus Christ is God the Son incarnate, there is some 
possible world w2 in which Jesus does not exist and the incarnation does 
not occur. So, using the inclusionist framework, in w2 we do not have 
one person with two minds (as we find in w1). rather, God the Son is 
not incarnate in that world. So while in w1 God has the power to have 
knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind, in w2, since God 
the Son is not incarnate in that world, God lacks that epistemic power. 
If this is right, then God’s power to have knowledge de se of the contents 
of a non-divine mind is not a power God necessarily possesses. So God’s 
epistemic power in w1 is greater than what God has in w2. If that is right, 
then God’s epistemic power is more limited in w2. Therefore, God is not 
essentially omniscient simpliciter.
A summary of the reasoning of this paper thus far is in order before 
proceeding. I have assumed that if God is omnipotent, God is necessarily 
omnipotent. I have also assumed that omniscience can be understood in 
terms of epistemic powers and, hence, in terms of omnipotence. If these 
two assumptions are correct, then God should have the same epistemic 
powers in every possible world if God is essentially omniscient. Assuming 
that God the Son is not incarnate in w2, God cannot have knowledge de 
se of the content of any non-divine mind in that world. but in w1, where 
God the Son is incarnate, God can have knowledge de se of the content 
of a non-divine mind. If God lacks the epistemic power in w2 that God 
has in w1 (where God the Son is incarnate), then God is not essentially 
omniscient (again, assuming that we can cash out omniscience in terms 
of epistemic powers).
state or includes a mental state, viz., belief, among its components is unimportant for my 
purposes here.
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III. Some obJeCTIoNS
In this section I consider four objections. None proves fatal to the line of 
reasoning offered above.
Objection 1: God’s epistemic powers do not need to hold fixed across 
possible worlds in order for God to be necessarily omniscient. 
omniscience can be relative to possible worlds. So while God’s actual 
epistemic powers may shift from world to world, so long as God is 
maximally epistemically powerful in each world, God will be omniscient 
in that world.
Reply to Objection 1: If God is necessarily omniscient (as traditional 
theists claim), then the set of God’s epistemic powers are fixed across 
possible worlds. To deny this will get us omniscience on the cheap. If we 
deny that the set of God’s epistemic powers is not fixed across possible 
worlds, then there would be worlds where God is considerably less 
epistemically powerful than God is in another world, yet God would 
still be omniscient in the less powerful world. To say that such a being 
is omniscient would strain credulity. moreover, from the standpoint of 
w1 (where God has the power to have knowledge de se of a non-divine 
mind), the God of w2 who has less epistemic power than the God of w1 
would fail to be omniscient.
If this is right, then it looks like God’s having the epistemic power 
to have knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind is not an 
essential power of God’s. So God’s epistemic powers are diminished in 
one world vis-à-vis another because of God the Son’s being incarnate 
in some worlds but not all worlds. If this is right, then God’s actual 
epistemic powers are not held fixed across possible worlds. So God is not 
necessarily omniscient.
Objection 2: Someone may argue that the epistemic powers God must 
possess in order to be omniscient does not have to be the same across 
possible worlds. rather, there is a  set of essential epistemic powers 
God must possess. The size of that set is determined by what epistemic 
powers remain stable across possible worlds. So since the power to have 
knowledge de se of a non-divine mind is not an essential epistemic power 
that God possesses, that particular epistemic power is not essential for 
God to be omniscient.
Reply to Objection 2: The proponent of the second objection does not 
offer any criterion for determining what is or is not an essential power. 
So the defender of such an objection would need to provide us with 
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a  criterion for determining what count as essential powers, including 
epistemic powers. If one is not careful, one may so narrow the set of 
essential epistemic powers (and powers more generally) that one winds 
up with something that is hardly worth regarding as omniscience (or 
omnipotence, for that matter).
Objection 3: This objection is closely related to the previous objections. 
Someone may hold the following view of powers. An agent S has a power 
P to do A in the actual world if S does A in some other possible world. So 
while Ian does not speak russian in the actual world, Ian has the power 
to speak russian because in some possible world he speaks russian.10 
Similarly, since there is some world in which God has knowledge de se of 
the contents of the human mind of Christ, God has this epistemic power 
in every possible world.
Reply to Objection 3: Such a conception of powers is far too generous. It 
turns out on this view that a person born blind from birth (suppose she 
has neither eyes nor visual cortices) has the power of sight in the actual 
world because there is some possible world where she sees. Consider 
another example. Suppose that margaret is very small and weak. She has 
difficulty lifting anything over 25 kg. on the conception of powers under 
consideration, margaret has the power to lift 500 kg because in some 
world she is a body builder. If we were to say to a normal person that 
margaret actually has the power to lift 500 kg, that person would most 
likely (justifiedly) laugh in our faces. margaret has the power to acquire 
the power to lift 500 kg. but she does not actually possess the power in 
question. And, in the case of Ian having the power to speak russian, he 
has the power to learn to speak russian. but absent learning to speak 
russian, he does not have the power to actually speak russian.
Similarly, if in w2 God the Son is not incarnate and, hence, lacks 
the power to have knowledge de se of a non-divine mind, then this is 
a metaphysically more salient fact about God in w2 than the fact that God 
does have the power to have knowledge de se of the content of a non-
divine mind in w1 because God the Son is incarnate in that world.
Objection 4: While God the Son is not necessarily incarnate, according to 
orthodox Christology, Jesus Christ is necessarily God the Son incarnate. 
That is, it was possible for God the Son not to take on a human nature, but 
Jesus Christ is essentially divine. So in every world in which Jesus exists, 
Jesus is God. For those worlds in which Jesus does not exist, if Jesus had 
10 Yujin Nagasawa suggested such an objection as well as the response that follows.
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existed in those worlds, then God the Son would be incarnate in Jesus 
in those worlds. If that is the case, then God would have the power to 
have knowledge de se of the content of the human mind of Jesus in every 
possible world. even if there are possible worlds in which the universe has 
no other persons, God possesses the relevant epistemic power in those 
worlds. but those are worlds in which God simply has no opportunity to 
manifest the relevant epistemic power that God, nonetheless, possesses. 
much as H2o possesses the power to dissolve NaCl even in worlds where 
it never manifests this power because of the absence of salt, so also God 
possesses the epistemic power in question even in worlds where God 
cannot manifest the power because God the Son is not incarnate in those 
worlds.11 Hence, God’s failing to have knowledge de se of the human 
mind of Christ is not indicative of a difference between God’s powers 
across possible worlds.
Reply to Objection 4: God’s ability to have knowledge de se of a  non-
human mind is a radically contingent power. God can only possess this 
power (even if never manifested) if God the Son is actually incarnate 
(i.e., only in a world in which Jesus exists).
Consider the following analogy. Suppose the only thing necessary for 
transworld identity is something like sameness of first-person perspective. 
In the actual world, David beckham has the ability to kick a ball because 
he has a body with that power. but there is a possible world in which he 
was born without legs. He does not have the power to kick a ball in that 
world. It is not a latent power beckham possesses but just cannot manifest 
because of his condition. moreover, in a world without the technology 
necessary for beckham to acquire functioning legs with which he can 
play football, it is not a power that beckham can come to possess.
Similarly, whether or not God has the epistemic power required to 
have knowledge de se of the contents of a  non-divine mind depends 
upon whether God the Son is incarnate in that world. God’s epistemic 
powers vis-à-vis the universe are restricted by how God relates to the 
world. And since God the Son is not necessarily incarnate, then God 
does not necessarily possess the power to have knowledge de se of the 
contents of a non-divine mind. Hence, God is not essentially omniscient 
if orthodox Christology is correct.
11 For more on the distinction between possessing and manifesting powers, see 
martin (2007).
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IV. oPTIoNS For THe CHrISTIAN THeIST
Traditional Christian theists who find the foregoing argument compelling 
have at least three options. each successive option takes the Christian 
further from orthodoxy than the previous one.
4.1. First option: God is not essentially omniscient
Some Christian theists may find this acceptable. After all, they may 
argue, what matters is what God is actually like and, they assert, God 
is actually omniscient, even if God is not essentially omniscient. Some, 
however, may find the cost of such a move to be too high. but given their 
other theological commitments, this may be the only viable option for 
the Christian theist who wishes to endorse orthodox Christology.
4.2. Second option: reject Chalcedonian Christology
I suspect that fewer Christian theists will find this option attractive. If 
one rejects Chalcedonian Christology, there are numerous options. 
Some are more extreme than others. For instance, one may endorse 
Apollinarianism, and deny that Jesus had a  human mind. This move 
would result in God lacking knowledge de se of the minds of any created 
persons. Some may reject the doctrine of the incarnation entirely. but 
those who wish to at least approximate historical Christianity will find 
this move unacceptable.
4.3. Third option: endorse a version of pantheism or panentheism
The final option is one at which many Christians would balk. but it is 
worth considering. It is perhaps the most radical solution.
If we accept some version of pantheism or panentheism (and assume 
the necessary existence of God), then God has knowledge de se of the 
contents of every mind in every possible world in which there are minds. 
This is so because the divine consciousness contains the consciousness 
of the myriad individual minds that populate the universe within it. And 
because of God’s relationship to the universe on this view, this is a power 
God has in every world since the universe constitutes, is identical with, 
or is a proper part of God. In some worlds, the universe has no conscious 
inhabitants. but if there were conscious inhabitants in that universe, God 
would have knowledge de se of the contents of their minds. God has 
the power to know the minds of the conscious inhabitants of a world 
because of how God relates to the universe in that world. The relevant 
epistemic power in such worlds is simply never manifested, but it is still 
69omNISCIeNCe, THe INCArNATIoN, AND KNoWleDGe De Se
a power possessed much as H2o in a universe without NaCl still has the 
power to dissolve NaCl.
one worry that some may have is that the uniqueness of the 
incarnation is lost on this view. everyone is divine, it might be argued. 
of course, any such response would involve committing the fallacy of 
division. The parts of my Honda Fit are not themselves a  Honda Fit. 
This is clearly the case if an object is a complex substance (such as my 
car) and the parts are substantial parts, but it is also the case with merely 
spatial parts. A  location in a  simple substance is not identical with 
every location in a substance and it is definitely not identical with the 
entire substance.12 Assuming that God is a  substance, whether God is 
a complex or simple substance, it does not follow that the proper parts 
(whether substantial if God is complex or merely spatial if God is simple) 
are also God if pantheism or panentheism is correct. moreover, it does 
not follow that God is united to every conscious being in the way God 
the Son is described as being united to Jesus of Nazareth according to 
orthodox Christology.
That said, if pan-inclusionism is true, then every created mind would 
stand to the divine mind as Christ’s mind does to God the Son’s mind 
according to inclusionist interpretations of orthodox Christology. of 
course, this fact alone would not be enough to establish that all created 
persons stand in the same sort of relationship to God that Christ does on 
orthodox Christology (the access relationship between God’s and Christ’s 
mind is only one aspect of the incarnation). However, if I am right, then 
God can have knowledge de se of the contents of every conscious mind, 
human and non-human, whether or not Jesus exists in a world.
At this point, orthodox Christians will no doubt worry that the 
doctrine of the incarnation has been effectively thrown out the window. 
This is not obviously the case. Some work must be done to account for 
how God could relate uniquely to Jesus of Nazareth in a  way suitable 
to provide the truthmakers for the creedal statements about the incarn-
ation. And most versions of pantheism and panentheism will not fit the 
bill. moreover, some variants of pantheism and panentheism that do 
not conflict with the Chalcedonian formula may still be vulnerable to 
the sort of knowledge argument presented in this paper.13 In any case, the 
12 See Heil (2012) for more on spatial versus substantial parts.
13 For instance, Forrest (2007) presents a variant of panentheism on which individual 
aware agents are like so many holes in God. God fills one of the holes in the incarnation. 
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third option for Christians may imply the second option. If they accept 
some version of pantheism or panentheism, they may have to give up 
Chalcedonian Christology (and much more). 
None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that the task of reconciliation 
is impossible. It may just require that Christians who accept the third 
option be as creative and open to resources from outside of the Christian 
tradition as their early forebears were who first articulated Christian 
doctrine using the resources provided by Platonism. In any case, 
such a  task goes well beyond the scope of this paper. but I  think it is 
a worthwhile one for Christian philosophical theologians to consider. It 
requires, however, that they be open to new ways of thinking about the 
nature of God, especially God’s relationship to the universe. If the price is 
too high to pay for some (and I suspect that most traditional Christians 
will find accepting any version of pantheism or panentheism to be too 
high a price to pay), there are always the other options I mentioned. In 
any case, there are no free lunches in philosophical theology.
CoNCluSIoN
my purpose in this essay has not been to attack orthodox Christology. 
my chief goal was to offer a knowledge argument that presents a unique 
challenge to orthodox Christian theists. If I  am right, then Christians 
who endorse orthodox Christology and take God to be omniscient 
must accept one of the options I mentioned in the previous section. This 
includes, but is not limited to, rethinking how Christians should think 
about the relationship of God to the universe.14
This account of the nature of God can deliver a Christology consistent with orthodoxy, 
but it falls prey to the sort of knowledge argument presented in this paper.
14 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2010 Central Division meeting 
of the American Philosophical Association. Thanks are due to Andrew Cullison, robert 
Garcia, Wes morriston, and especially Yujin Nagasawa for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper. my work on this paper was generously supported by a grant 
from the John Templeton Foundation (Yujin Nagasawa is my co-investigator) supporting 
research on ‘Alternative Concepts of God’. The views expressed in this paper do not 
reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
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